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We use a unique data of representative migrants and urban local workers in 15 Chinese 
cities to investigate entrepreneurship and credit constraints under labour market 
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want-to-be entrepreneurs. Both groups are very similar in terms of risk taking preferences 
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by negative financial shocks in the year before. Our back-of-envelope calculation reveals that 
overcoming the current level of credit constraints may be worth 2% of GDP per year direct 
earnings increases.   
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Are there credit constraints that reduce the incentives to become entrepre-
neurs? If so, then such constraints provide a rationale for subsidies and
access to cheap loans. Many previous studies have argued credit constraints
matter and distort incentives, particularly for business start-ups (Evans and
Leighton, 1989; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and
Rosen, 1994; Blanch￿ ower and Oswald, 1998; Astero and Bernhardt, 1999;
Blanch￿ ower, 2004). Thus, in many developed countries government pro-
vides preferential access to venture capital or favorable tax treatments for
small businesses (Porteretal, 2000; Djankov et al., 2002; Fonseca et al., 2007;
Ardagna and Lusardi, 2008), whilst in developing countries the policy op-
tions include the Grameen Bank initiative and other micro-￿nance schemes
(Yunus, 2006; Khander, 2005).
In this paper we look for the existence and e⁄ect of credit constraints
amongst Chinese rural-to-urban migrants. What makes this group especially
interesting is that they face strong overt discrimination in the wage-earning
sector,1 leading to largely unexplored interactions with credit constraints.
The main hypothesis we investigate is that discrimination in the salaried
labour market increases the incentives to become an entrepreneur for mi-
grants, thereby o⁄-setting the incentive perversion of credit constraints.
Rural migrants, currently amounting to 150 million people, account for
over one third of the urban Chinese workforce. Of these migrants, about a
quarter are entrepreneurs, whereas the ratio for their urban ￿ native￿coun-
terparts is only 8 percent. It has previously been argued by Hericourt and
Poncet (2007) that all private enterprises in China face high credit constraints
due to a lack of access to bank loans. This should be worse for migrants since
they are often legally discriminated against in the labour market (see, for ex-
ample, Zhao, 2000) and their assets in their home villages cannot be used
as collateral. Consistent with this, we ￿nd in our data that formal ￿nan-
cial institutions provide no more than 2% of the initial investments made by
current migrant entrepreneurs and that around a quarter of the salaried mi-
grants want to be entrepreneurs, blaming credit constraints for their inability
to leave salaried employment.
The question arises whether we can identify the intermediate steps be-
tween discrimination and the high proportions of migrants who are currently
entrepreneurs or want to be an entrepreneur. In a ￿rst step, we ascertain
what the expected jump in hourly income is when going from a salaried job to
1The discrimination that migrants in China face is multidimensional: most migrants
do not have free access to social welfare available to urban residents. Also, in many cities
they are legally barred from access to the most desirable jobs in the salaried sector.
1an entrepreneurial position for a migrant as opposed to a non-migrant. One
main ￿nding is that current migrant entrepreneurs earn about 30% more
per hour than migrant wage-salary earners, with a much smaller gap for
non-migrants.
Given this large asymmetry, we further investigate whether it is indeed
credit constraints that prevent more migrants from moving to the entrepre-
neurial sector. Apart from simply asking the migrants about their credit con-
straints, we look at whether there are more negative wealth shocks amongst
the group of migrants who wanted to be, but did not become, entrepreneurs.
All the evidence points to an a¢ rmative answer. The remaining ￿ big￿ques-
tion we address is the degree to which less discrimination would lead to fewer
entrepreneurs.
To guide the analysis, we develop a simple descriptive model with two sec-
tors (wage-salary and entrepreneurship), two groups of individuals (migrants
and urban locals), and two markets (labour and capital markets). Migrants
are discriminated against in the salaried labour market but all business start-
ups face credit constraints. The model generates testable predictions as well
as welfare implications.
The main contributions of the paper are empirical. First, we de￿ne our
entrepreneurs carefully as a subset of the self-employed. In many developing
and developed countries, the self-employed are made up of two quite distinct
groups (cf. La Porta and Schleifer 2008): those who choose to be entrepre-
neurs and those from the bottom of society who could not ￿nd jobs in the
paid employment sector.2 It is the ￿rst group one expects to be credit con-
strained, not the second. In line with this, Banerjee et al. (2009) and Karlan
and Zinman (2010) report on randomised access to microcredit and ￿nd that
the main bene￿t of more credit is for those who choose to be entrepreneurs.
Using a unique survey with specially designed modules we distinguish be-
tween those who choose to be entrepreneurs and those self-employed who
prefer to be wage-salary earners but could not ￿nd the job they wanted; and
between wage-salary earners who want-to-be entrepreneurs and those wage-
salary earners who do not. These distinctions help us to isolate the groups
potentially a⁄ected by credit constraints.
Second, we use exogenous shocks to individual wealth to identify the role
of credit constraints. This builds on the works of Blanch￿ ower and Oswald
(1998), Hurst and Lusardi (2004), and Wang (2010) who use inheritances and
housing asset changes as positive wealth shocks to study the importance of
2For a long time, the existence of the latter group lead economists to regard self-
employment as a stepping stone to the formal sector (see Todaro, 1969; Fields,1975;
Mazumdar, 1976, 1977, and Lal, 1973). This latter group is in fact too unproductive
to ￿nd a formal sector job and hence should not be regarded as entrepreneurs.
2credit constraints. Inheritances are not randomly allocated and are to some
extent anticipated, whilst regional housing price variations may relate to the
regional macro-economic environment and, as such, it may a⁄ect entrepre-
neurship directly. Instead, we use negative events in the previous year, such
as an illness or death in the family, which have signi￿cant credit constraining
implications, but are unlikely to directly impact on whether one is prone to
entrepreneurship.
Third, to control for possible selectivity into entrepreneurship, we draw
on both self-reported information and laboratory information on trust and
risk-preference, which have been found to be important predictors of entre-
preneurship in previous studies (see, for example, Blau, 1985; Fairlie and
Meyer, 2000; Wagner, 2005; and Qian et al., 2006; Ardagna and Lusardi,
2008). The laboratory measurements cover over a quarter of our migrant
sample and included measures of risk-aversion, intelligence, and reciprocity.
Want-to-be entrepreneurs are found to be very similar to current entrepre-
neurs in terms of risk taking preferences and the size of their network. If
anything, the want-to-be entrepreneurs may be more suitable to be entrepre-
neurs as they are more educated. The most important di⁄erences between
the two groups are that (1) the want-to-be entrepreneurs have spent less time
in cities than current entrepreneurs and hence have less time to accummulate
wealth in cities; and (2) they are more likely to have su⁄ered from negative
￿nancial events in the year before the survey.
Fourth, our data allow us to directly measure the amount of initial invest-
ments and the level of credit constraint the want-to-be entrepreneurs face.
We are also able to estimate the excess returns on current entrepreneurs￿ s
initial investments.
Finally, we examine whether the high rate of current and want-to-be
entrepreneurship is related to the labour market discrimination against mi-
grants by looking at whether there are more potential entrepreneurs in cities
where migrants face a higher unexplained wage penalty in the salary sector.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 examines
the literature on entrepreneurship and credit constraints in the OECD and
China and discusses particular institutional details relevant to the issue. Sec-
tion 3 sets up a descriptive model in order to guide the discussion. Section 4
introduces the data and examines the aggregate di⁄erences between entrepre-
neurs and wage-earners. Sections 5 and 6 present empirical results. Section
7 considers the level of credit constraints and its welfare implications, and
Section 8 concludes.
32 Literature and institutions
2.1 Literature
The de￿nition of entrepreneurs is not uniform across studies. Some include
the low-earning self-employed and some do not. Depending on how entre-
preneurship is de￿ned, the characteristics of entrepreneurs vary signi￿cantly
in the literature. For example, amongst the low-earning self-employed in the
OECD there is an over-representation of men, migrants from poorer countries
(Sanders and Nee 1996; Constant et al. 2003), and individuals who could
not ￿nd a wage-earning job (Earle and Zakova 1998; Andersson and Waden-
sjo, 2006); the high-earning self-employed and small business owners are on
the other hand more likely to be highly educated (Dawson et al. 2009), and
wealthier (Nykvist, 2008; Hurst and Lusardi, 2004; Mesnard, 2004). The sec-
ond group is more likely to be subject to credit constraints since many jobs
in the low-earning self-employment sector, which would include jobs such as
street vendors and car-screen wipers, require little capital and do not appear
to be subject to any signi￿cant entry barrier.
The varying proportions of these two groups in di⁄erent places at di⁄erent
times has led to an almost bewildering set of seemingly incompatible ￿ndings
on earnings of ￿ entrepreneurs￿ .3 Even for the same groups in the same coun-
try, results di⁄er depending on subtleties in the de￿nition, often centering
around the issue of whether one includes small businesses and whether one
uses log-earnings or absolute earnings (Portes and Zhou, 1996; Hamilton,
2000).
With regard to credit constraints, the literature often ￿nds that although
the characteristics of entrepreneurs may di⁄er from country to country, a
common constraint for all countries is access to start-up capital. Thus, credit
constraints have long been seen as an important factor which can make or
break an entrepreneur (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Evans and Jovanovic,
1989; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen, 1994; Blanch￿ ower and Oswald,
1998; Blanch￿ ower, 2004).
Empirically measuring credit constraints is di¢ cult. Earlier literature of-
ten uses family wealth as a measure for the degree to which credit constraints
bind and showed that those with higher family wealth are more likely to be
entrepreneurs. This has, for instance, been used to rationalize why African
Americans, who are on average much less wealthy than Caucasian Ameri-
3For instance: whilst the self-employed on average have been found to earn about 35%
less in the U.S. in the 1980s than comparable wage-earners (Hamilton, 2000), self-employed
immigrants in the U.S. earn much higher income than their counterparts in the wage-salary
sector (Lofstrom, 2002).
4cans, are far less likely to be self-employed (Fairley and Meyer, 2000); why
relatively few Mexicans are entrepreneurs in the US (Lofstrom and Wang,
2007); or why it is that the richer return migrants in Tunisia are more likely
to set up new businesses (Mesnard, 2004 and Mesnard and Ravallion, 2006).
However, as Blanch￿ ower and Oswald (1998) point out, the correlation
between family wealth and becoming an entrepreneur may not be causal
as both of them could be an outcome of unobserved characteristics, such
as being ￿acquisitive￿ .4 Blanch￿ ower and Oswald (1998), therefore, propose
a new way to investigate the causal e⁄ect, namely using a random shock
to individuals￿wealth to examine whether such a shock a⁄ects individuals￿
choice to become entrepreneurs. They used inheritances and gifts as random
shocks to wealth and found that the probability of self-employment depends
positively on these shocks.
Expanding on the basic methodology of Blanch￿ ower and Oswald (1998),
Hurst and Lusardi (2004) and Nanda (2010) have found that the relationship
between wealth and entrepreneurship is non-linear and only occurs for the top
5% of the wealth distribution5. This calls into question whether the relation
between wealth and self-employment really shows the presence of initial credit
constraints rather than that being self-employed is a luxury activity of which
the wealthy buy more. Furthermore, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) also ￿nd that
inheritances may not be a good measure of a random shock to one￿ s wealth
as they ￿nd that both past and future inheritances predict current business
entry, indicating that inheritances may capture something innate rather than
a shock. The authors propose instead to use variations across regions on
housing price appreciation as a random shock to households￿wealth and ￿nd
that such a shock has no e⁄ect on individuals￿probability to start a business.
On the basis of this result they conclude that in the U.S. liquidity constraints
are not empirically important in deterring small business ventures. One
counter argument is that increases in housing prices are not random events
and will be related to general economic activity which may itself a⁄ect things
like the initial costs of being an entrepreneur. This is why in our empirical
4One indication in the direction of family traits is that self-employed Americans are
more likely than others to have had self-employed fathers (Hout and Rosen, 2000). In the
presence of such traits, the observed correlation between wealth and self-employment may
not be a sign of credit constraints but due to reverse causality.
5This empirical ￿nding is the opposite of the prediction of Buera (2009) who has a
model in which workers di⁄er in terms of both initial wealth and aptitude for being an
entrepreneur whilst facing credit constraints. In that model, there is a sorting e⁄ect in that
those wage-workers with high wealth who are still not an entrepreneur are those with no
comparative advantage as an entrepreneur. It seems likely that his theoretical prediction
that the proportion of entrepeneurs does not go up with income at high levels of wealth
would go away if one allows for entrepreneurship as a luxury good.
5application we will try to look for di⁄erent indicators of largely unanticipated
negative ￿nancial shocks.
Wang (2010) uses a very similar strategy to Hurst and Lusardi (2004) in
that he looks at particular urban workers who were given the opportunity
to buy their subsidised state-owned housing at relatively low prices and who
subsequently were more likely than others to become an entrepreneur. Yet,
Iyer et al. (2009) argue that the implementation of the relevant housing
reforms was gradual and haphazard and that it is hard to ￿nd any e⁄ect of
the housing reforms.
A di⁄erent approach to credit constraints has been to look at aggregate
indicators of the regulations applying in a country, looking at the actual
costs of starting a business and the ease with which loans can be obtained
(see Kerr and Nanda (2009) for a review). Porter et al. (2000), Djankov et al.
(2002), Fonseca et al. (2007), and Ardagna and Lusardi (2008) for instance
￿nd that in countries with greater entry costs (such as longer waiting times
for a permit), the number of entrepreneurs is lower.6
Studies of entrepreneurship in China are limited and many of them focus
on rural China. In general, education is a key determinant for rural farmers
choosing self-employment and the o⁄spring of self-employed rural residents
are more likely to be self-employed themselves (Zhang, et al. 2006 and Mo-
hapatra, Rozelle, and Goodhue, 2007). In urban areas, entrepreneurs are
more wealthy, more risk-taking, and have larger social networks from which
to borrow (Qian et al., 2006).
2.2 Institutions
Over the past 20 or so years, stimulated by the fast economic growth in
China, hundreds of millions of rural residents moved to cities to ￿nd jobs.
The major di⁄erence with other developing countries who experienced rural-
urban migration is China￿ s household registration system, called Hukou. The
Hukou system was initiated in the early 1950s. It enabled the government to
sustain a rural-urban divide which was deemed to be necessary for keeping
farmers producing enough agriculture product to fuel the industrialization
process and to limit the cost of a very generous social welfare system im-
plemented in cities (Perkins and Yusuf 1984; Meng, 2000; and Meng and
Manning, 2010). Under the Hukou system, individuals in general were not
6Ardagna and Lusardi (2009), using a panel dataset of 44 developing and developed
countries, ￿nd that more restrictive regulations disproportionately a⁄ect those with more
stated business skills and contacts. Dulleck et al. (2006) ￿nd similar results and also that
the greater ease of entry might have an added e⁄ect on the prior decisions of individuals
to get educated.
6allowed to move out of their birth place. In the following decades, there was
hardly any labour mobility between rural and urban regions and rural people
did not have government provided social welfare, while urban people enjoyed
cradle-to-grave social welfare provision.
It was not until the early 1990s, when economic growth started to pick
up, which generated demand for migrant labor, that the mobility restric-
tions were gradually eased. Nevertheless, migrant workers have not been
treated the same way as their local incumbents and, until recently, most of
the discrimination against migrant workers was institutionalized. For exam-
ple, migrants were only allowed to take jobs which local incumbents were
unwilling to take. Even doing the same job, migrants were often paid lower
earnings and were not entitled to employer contributions to various insur-
ance schemes (West and Zhao 2000; Meng 2000; Meng and Zhang 2001; Du,
Gregory and Meng 2006). Due to the institutionalized discrimination, rural-
urban migrants in China are like ￿guest workers￿who come to cities during
their youth to make money and go home in their mid 30s or early 40s to set-
tle (the estimated average length of stay of a migrant in our data is 7 years,
with the self-employed staying 8.7 years and wage/salaried workers staying
6.1 years).
Perhaps as a result of the legal discrimination in the wage-salary sector,
migrants are more likely to be self-employed. The 2005 one percent Inter-
census population survey shows that while some 20% of migrants are self-
employed in the urban labour market, this ratio is only 11% for urban local
people. Our own results (see later) show that this di⁄erence has become more
pronounced. The typical migrant entrepreneur runs a small shop, a beauty
salon, a cleaning agency, or a maintenance business. Becoming self-employed
requires a permit and depends on having a su¢ ciently large network.
Credit is hard to get in China. A survey looking at 94 countries in
2000 by the World Bank found that about 80% of privately owned ￿rms in
China see ￿nancing constraints as a problem, whilst the ￿gure is only 39% in
the median country, making China the most ￿nancially constrained country
in that sample (World Bank 2003). Loans from formal banks to private
individuals did not become available in China until the early 2000s, with
the state owned formal banks mistrusting private individuals and ￿rms. It
was estimated that by the mid 2000s, China￿ s private companies produced
more than half of its GDP, but only received 27 percent of loans (Farrell and
Lund, 2006). One study found that Chinese ￿rms, especially private ￿rms,
are among the most credit constrained ￿rms in the world (Hericourt and
Poncet, 2007). Credit is even harder to get for Chinese migrants since their
lack of an Urban Hukou makes it hard to accumulate visible collateral in the
cities.
73 A Descriptive Model
3.1 The model
Our main interest is in describing the choice between being self-employed
and having a salaried job, subject to the constraint that it takes a threshold
amount of wealth to be able to become an entrepreneur. Our model starts
with specifying the utility of a job, after which the wealth constraints are
modeled, yielding a simple set of predictions about who will be entrepreneurs
and what they will earn.
Take the utility derived by individual i of working in job j to be
Uij = wij + u2(xij); (1)
where wij denotes the hourly income individual i can command in job j;
u2(xij) denotes the amenity value of job j, which, when thinking about being
salaried or self-employed, can include things like autonomy and risk. There
are two types of jobs j, salaried (sa) and entrepreneurs (en), and the amenity
value of being salaried is normalized to be zero.
Access to entrepreneurial jobs is subject to being able to raise enough
the required level of start-up capital ~ Mi: This level di⁄ers by individual and
we here think of the costs of getting a permit, the cost of getting premises,
and the cost of equipment. We can think of this amount as the outcome
of a search for entrepreneurial opportunities and thus likely to be lower for
individuals with many contacts and a lot of experience. The total amount
of capital a person can raise is denoted as Mi and is assumed to depend on
personal characteristics, including an extended family and contacts, and all
existing assets which will include the ownership of a house and longer working
experience. Formally, the amount of capital someone can raise equals:
ln(Mi) = Z
0
i￿ + vi; (2)
where Zi is the vector of characteristics and vi an error term. If Mi < ~ Mi
then we will call someone credit constrained. In the data, we ask entre-
preneurs how high ~ Mi was when they started their business, and we ask
non-entrepreneurs how high ~ Mi is, as well as the proportion of ~ Mi that an
individual thinks they can borrow from others.
Hourly returns depend on skill and Urban Hukou:
wij = x
0
i(￿j + ￿0(non ￿ UHukoui) ￿ I(j=sa)) + ￿ij (3)
Here, x0
i￿j denotes the return to skill in the di⁄erent sectors. The key
testable assumption on the presence of discrimination is that x0
i￿0 < 0 and
8that hence the returns for being an entrepreneur are relatively higher for
migrants.7 Put equivalently, the returns to being in the salaried sector are
relatively higher for Urban Hukou holders. The term x0
i￿0 can be seen as
either a form of direct taxation of non-Urban Hukou holders in the salaried
sector, or else as the reduced-form result of a model with di⁄erential access to
di⁄erent types of jobs. We will talk about ￿0 as the degree of discrimination.
In the empirical section, we will look for whether di⁄erential returns to
skill exist (they do), whether they are relatively higher for Urban Hukou
holders in the salaried labour market (they are), and whether the returns
are the same for Urban Hukou holders and non-Urban Hukou holders in the
entrepreneurial sector (they are close).
3.2 Solutions and predictions
An individual becomes an entrepreneur i⁄ Mi > ~ Mi and the utility of being
an entrepreneur is greater than that of being salaried, which holds when
u2(xi;en) > x
0
i(￿sa ￿ ￿en + ￿0(non ￿ UHukoui)) + ￿isa ￿ ￿ien (4)
u2(xi;en) > ￿i; (5)
where ￿i = x0
i(￿sa ￿ ￿en + ￿0(non ￿ UHukoui)) + ￿isa ￿ ￿ien denotes the
minimum amenity value a self-employed person must attain in order to want
to be self-employed.
If we take a simple linear function for u2(xi;en) = X0
i￿+ei; where Xi is a
subset of xi and ei an error term, we get the following solution equation:
P(j = enjXi;UHukoui) = P(Mi > ~ Mi) ￿ P(ei > ￿i ￿ X
0
i￿jMi > ~ Mi) (6)
This solution equation shows that being an entrepreneur is a function of
credit constraints, the bene￿ts of being self-employed, and the initial char-
acteristics of the pool of individuals making the choice (migrants and urban
residents).
The predictions that follow from the model which we will look for in the
analyses section are:
1. (The income gap) All else equal, the hourly income-gap between en-
trepreneurs and salaried individuals is greater for individuals without
7Hourly income includes the excess return to the initial investment, which means wages
and credit constraints will be related. This possibility will be directly explored by the
inclusion of initial investment in x0
i￿j.
9Urban Hukou than for individuals with Urban Hukou. This is the key
testable assumption underlying the model.
2. (Urban Hukou and entrepreneurship) All else equal, individuals with-
out Urban Hukou are more likely to be self-employed than individuals
with Urban Hukou. This is because the utility bene￿t of being self-
employed is less for Urban Hukou holders.
3. (Wealth and self-employment) All else equal, individuals with greater
amounts of initial wealth, lower capital needs, and a higher ability to
borrow (Mi is higher) are less likely to be credit constrained and more
likely to be self-employed. We will look for random negative shocks to
wealth in the preceding year to help identify this channel.
4. (Start-up costs and self-employment) All else equal, actual entrepre-
neurs are likely to need less start-up capital ~ Mi than salaried workers
who would want to be entrepreneurs, i.e. P(Mi > ~ Mi) is higher for
individuals with lower ~ Mi. Intuitively, this is because those migrants
with low capital needs are more likely than those with high capital
needs to meet their low needs.
The econometric problem we face is that there are major selection issues
in every part of the solution equation to P(j = enjXi;UHukoui): there
is a strong likelihood that the initial characteristics do not have the same
distribution across populations in that migrants are likely to di⁄er from urban
residents in many measured and unmeasured ways; entrepreneurs will be self-
selected for their observed skills and are likely to be di⁄erent from salaried
workers in many unmeasured ways as well. Credit constraints are unlikely to
be equally severe for everyone, leading to a further selectivity issue for the
entrepreneurs.
To address the selection problems, we will rely on both random varia-
tion on sources of credit constraints and on self-reported data. We will thus
look for instruments related to credit capacity Mi that are likely to be unre-
lated to any of the error terms involved in P(j = enjXi;UHukoui) and that
help identify the existence of credit constraints. We will use both standard
hourly returns regressions that control for as much as possible, as well as
self-reported counterfactuals to identify the structural parameters ￿j and ￿0:
104 The Data
4.1 Survey and sample
The data used in this study come from the Rural-Urban Migration in China
and Indonesia (RUMiCI) project, which includes longitudinal surveys in both
countries. The RUMiCI China survey comprises three randomly selected
samples:8 the rural household sample surveys households living in rural ar-
eas with rural Hukou (rural sample), the urban household sample covers
households living in urban areas with Urban Hukou (urban sample), and
the migrant sample comprises households working in urban areas with rural
Hukou (migrant sample). The ￿rst wave of the survey was conducted in
2008. In 2009 a purposely designed module was added to help study self-
employment and credit constraints. In this study we employ the 2009 survey
data from the urban and migrant samples. We restrict our sample to indi-
viduals who are aged 16 to 65 and at the time of the survey earn positive
earnings from self-employment or wage-salaried jobs.9
The urban and migrant surveys were conducted in 15 cities from nine
provinces: Guangzhou, Dongguan, Shenzhen, Zhengzhou, Luoyang, Hefei,
Bangbu, Chongqing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuxi, Hangzhou, Ningbo, Wuhan,
and Chengdu.10 The 2009 migrant sample has 5241 households and 8939
individuals. Of these individuals 7116 indicated that they were working at
the time of survey. The urban sample in the same 15 cities has 4923 house-
holds and 14924 individuals. Among them, 6955 were working. Excluding
observations with missing values, our ￿nal sample comprises 6789 migrant
workers and 6487 urban workers.
One major concern arising from studies in other countries is whether
the self-employment sector is where the bottom of society ends up, for in-
stance as street vendors, house maids, gardeners, etc. If this is the case,
self-employment may be regarded as a stepping stone to the formal sec-
tor and credit constraints are not a relevant consideration (Hamilton 2000;
Blanch￿ ower 2004).
To screen out those individuals for whom stepping-stone activities might
be relevant, we de￿ne the current entrepreneurs as a sub-set of the self-
employed using the questions ￿Why did you become self-employed?￿and ￿Do
8For detailed sampling information, see http:nnrumici.anu.edu.au.
932 migrants and 21 urban workers with zero or negative earned income are excluded.
Inclusion of these observations does not change our results in any way. Unpaid family
workers are excluded from the sample.
10The urban sample includes four other cities where no migrants were interviewed. These
are excluded from the current study.
11you still want to become a wage-salary worker?￿ .11 The group that indicates
that their reason for becoming self-employed in the ￿rst place was that they
were unable to ￿nd a wage-salary job and the group that indicated that
they were currently still wanting to ￿nd a wage-salaried job, are labeled as a
separate group of ￿involuntary self-employed￿ .
Previous studies of other countries have looked at the general question of
whether individuals want to be self-employed and suspicion has arisen that
many individuals who say they want to be entrepreneurs are not serious. For
example, when considering self-employment surveys in the OECD countries,
Blanch￿ ower (2004) notes the large discrepancy between the high proportions
of employees who say they would like to set up their own business and the
few who end up doing so.
Mindful of the possibility of cheap talk, we de￿ne a group of ￿want-to-be￿
entrepreneurs from the questions ￿Have you ever thought about becoming self-
employed?￿with answers being: 1. No, never; 2. have not thought carefully
as it seems to be too di¢ cult, and 3. yes, I have thought (carefully) about it;
and ￿If you have thought (carefully) about it, what stopped you from becoming
one?￿ . The choices for the second question are: 1. cannot borrow enough
money; 2. do not have a network for obtaining a permit and/or customers;
3. A self-employed job is too hard; 4. The income for self-employment is too
low; and 5. other.
We de￿ne ￿want-to-be￿entrepreneurs to be those who indicated that they
had thought (carefully) about becoming self-employed and that the reason
they did not was either being credit constrained or network constrained. We
interpret any other answer to the second question as not serious. We also
asked all those who had thought about becoming self-employed what they
thought they would need as an initial investment to set up the business of
their own choice and the proportion of this initial investment that they could
borrow from formal and informal ￿nancial institutions, relatives, and friends.
4.2 General summary statistics
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1, where the panels A and B present
the information for the migrant and urban samples, respectively. The ￿rst
rows of the two panels present the distribution of the workers among the
four groups: the entrepreneurs, the involuntary self-employed, the ￿want-to-
be￿entrepreneurs, and the ￿happy to be￿wage-salary earners. Of the 2061
migrant individuals who seriously thought about becoming self-employed,
11The precise questions are listed in Appendix A. The variable de￿nitions closely mirror
the survey by Qian et al. (2006).
1276% reported they were either credit constrained or network constrained.
They are termed ￿want-to-be￿entrepreneurs. The salaried workers who do
not profess a constraint-lead desire to be self-employed are included in the
group that is happy being wage-salary earners. Among the 363 urban workers
who seriously thought about becoming self-employed, those qualifying as
￿want-to-be￿entrepreneurs account for only 38%.12
The table shows that around 28% of the total migrant workers are cur-
rently self-employed and 23% is de￿ned in this paper as being entrepreneurs.
Of the 72% of migrants who are currently wage-salary earners around one-
third (or 22% of the total migrants) are ￿want-to-be￿ entrepreneurs and
the rest are happy to be wage-salary earners. For the urban sample, self-
employment only accounted for 8.8% of the total workers and among them
most (8 percent of the sample) are de￿ned as entrepreneurs. Only 3.4% of ur-
ban workers are want-to-be entrepreneurs. These comparisons indicate that
migrants are three times more likely to be entrepreneurs and 6 times more
likely to be ￿want-to-be￿entrepreneurs.
Table 1 also shows that among migrants, entrepreneurs work around 35%
more hours and earn 50% higher earnings than wage-salary workers.13 Among
urban workers, entrepreneurs work 34% more hours and earn 23% higher
earnings than wage-salary workers. These raw ￿gures suggest that migrant
entrepreneurs are relatively better-o⁄ than their urban counterparts. An-
other interesting point regarding hourly earnings is that the involuntarily
self-employed not only on average earn less than the entrepreneurs but also
earn less than the current wage-salary earners. This is true for both mi-
grant and urban samples, suggesting that they are a very di⁄erent group to
the other self-employed. Indeed, if we compare this group with that of the
entrepreneurs, we ￿nd that they are older and less educated.
Other information presented in Table 1 shows that migrant and urban
entrepreneurs, as well as involuntarily self-employed, are older than wage-
salary earners, and that they have less schooling. Given the strong increase
in education in recent years (Luo et al. 2010), the lower education of the
entrepreneurs is partially directly due to their older age. In addition, for the
12As a comparison, Qian et al. (2006) found that 48 out of their 82 interviewees who were
￿ serious￿about becoming self-employed listed credit constraints and network constraints.
13Since total income equals revenue minus costs, there is more scope for the self-reported
total income of entrepreneurs to be biased. We tried to cross-validate the income data
with total household consumption data. The ratio of consumption to income is 67% for
entrepreneurs versus 63% for salaried workers, indicating that if the unobserved savings
ratios are the same for both, total income is actually relatively underestimated for en-
trepreneurs. The raw-di⁄erence in consumption expenditure between entrepreneurs and
salaried migrants is thus almost exactly the same as that of total income (50%).
13migrant sample we ￿nd that the self-employed have been in cities longer and
are more likely to be women. With regard to industry distribution, the self-
employed are more likely to be in retail/wholesale trade and service sectors,
while higher percentages of wage-salary earners are working in construction,
manufacturing and other sectors. These patterns are consistent across the
two samples.
4.3 Trust, risk-taking, networks, and ￿nancial shocks
Given the importance of risk-taking in the literature on entrepreneurs, the
survey asked individuals to assess their own risk taking tendency. The ques-
tion we used was ￿Some people in a society are more likely to take risk while
others are less likely. On a scale from zero to ten, where zero indicates ￿ do
not take any risk￿and ten indicates ￿ like to take risk very much￿ , could you
please rank your own risk taking level￿ . We also assessed individuals￿trust
behavior by asking them to answer the following question ￿In general, do you
think most people can be trusted?￿and the answers are 1. yes, most people
can be trusted; 2. one should be careful about other people; and 3. do not
know.
Entrepreneurs are generally thought to be more risk-taking and this has
previously been found in China too (Qian et al. 2006). Table 1 shows that the
￿want-to-be￿entrepreneurs in both samples seem to have the highest average
risk scores, while the self-employed (both entrepreneurs and involuntary self-
employed) in the migrant sample are in the least risk taking group. This is
rather counter intuitive. But as these are unconditional means, it is likely
that the low scores for the self-employed group is related to the fact that on
average they are much older than the salaried workers and that age is often
found to be positively correlated with risk aversion in the literature. For
the urban sample, it is the wage-salary earning and prefer-to-be wage-salary
earners group which has the lowest risk score, more in line with expectations
and the earlier ￿ndings of Qian et al. (2006) whose sample consisted of Urban
Hukou holders.
Table 1 also reports the proportion of respondents who thought that most
people can be trusted. It seems that the self-employed (both entrepreneurs
and involuntary self-employed) have the lowest trust score in the migrant
group, while the ￿want-to-be￿entrepreneurs have the highest scores. For the
urban workers, current and ￿want-to-be￿entrepreneurs have similar scores
on trust, again a ￿nding that mimics the results of Qian et al. (2006) where
56% of urban entrepreneurs thought most people could be trusted, compared
to 54% of their urban salary workers. Hence there certainly seems to be a
selection on trust and risk amongst entrepreneurs but not in the direction
14initially expected and clearly di⁄ering by sample.
Our survey also asks individuals to report on how many people they
contacted during the last Chinese New Year by sending cards or exchang-
ing presents, and among them how many were located in urban areas. The
information on total contacts can be used as a proxy for the size of the net-
work of an individual. The summary statistics show that on average urban
workers have more contacts than migrant workers. In addition, ￿want-to-be￿
entrepreneurs have larger networks than others in both samples. However,
the quality of the network de￿ned this way may di⁄er considerably between
migrants and urban local workers in that migrant contacts includes people
living in their hometown rather than in the city they currently live in. Be-
cause it is the urban contacts which capture the social capital better, in the
main regression below we use the total number of contacts which are from
the city individuals are currently living in. The data presented in Table 1
shows that while only 45% of the migrant contacts are living in the same
city, this ratio for urban workers is 88%.
Finally, all the respondents in our survey were asked to report whether in
the past year (t ￿ 1) a series of life events happened to them or their family
members. The nine events included: 1. A marriage; 2. Found a partner; 3.
A pregnancy; 4. A birth of own children; 5. Found a good job; 6. A divorce
or separation; 7. Serious illness or injury; 8. A death in the family; 9. Built
or bought a new house. Among these events, the last four (6 to 9) should be
signi￿cantly related to credit constraints as they inevitably require signi￿cant
amounts of spending at the household level. We therefore construct a dummy
variable indicating whether any of these four events occurred during the past
year. Among migrants, those in the involuntary self-employment and the
￿want-to-be￿entrepreneur group have the highest probability of having any
of the above mentioned events occur during the past year; whereas among
urban workers, the events seem to have occurred equally across the four
groups of individuals.
4.4 Laboratory experiments
Table 1b shows the summary statistics for the sub-sample of 1633 migrants
who were involved in laboratory experiments. These experiments were done
in rented school classes, with participants being given a show-up fee and
compensated for their travel costs. The amount the participants earned
hourly on average corresponded to more than double their normal hourly
earnings (i.e. they were given about some 20 Yuan per hour). Although a
random sample of the surveyed migrants was invited to participate, Table 1b
shows that the people who turned up were not representative of the migrant
15survey population. There are fewer entrepreneurs (15% as opposed to 23%),
they are younger (30.53 years on average as opposed to 31.92), they are much
more risk-taking (their self-assessed risk score is 4.24 as opposed to 3.34), and
they essentially vary in most dimensions from the general migrant sample.
This in itself shows the di¢ culty of getting a representative sample of people
to participate in ￿eld experiments.
The experiments consisted of an IQ test that took about 30 minutes,
a risk-taking game that consisted of individuals picking a switching point
corresponding to a particular lottery with an ever increasing probability of
winning but a lower gain if successful (the higher the switching point, the
more risk-averse an individual), and a pure reciprocity game where individu-
als were paired and one sent the other a certain amount of money which got
multiplied by three after which the person who was sent the initial amount
had the option of sending back a discretionary amount. The amount origi-
nally sent is taken as a measure of the degree of trust of the sender, and each
participant had a turn at being the sender. Further details of the experiments
are presented in Appendix B
One question that can immediately be answered with these laboratory
tests is how well they line up against subjective measures of risk and trust.
Dohmen et al. (2005) and Ding et al. (2010) ￿nd that questionnaire responses
to the general risk question are reliable predictors of actual risk-taking behav-
ior in experiments. For our sample, Figure 1 presents the relation between
self-assessed risk and trust measures and the risk and trust measures revealed
from the game data. The left panel shows the relation between the real lot-
tery game switch point, where a higher switch point means the subject is
more risk averse, and our self assessed risk measure which is increasing in
the level of risk-loving. The graph shows a strong relation, with a correlation
coe¢ cient of 0.70. The right panel presents the relation between self-assessed
trust and the trust game result. The ￿tted line again shows a strong rela-
tion with a correlation of 0.56, meaning that self-reported measures of trust
and risk-taking do seem to be reasonably good measures of how individuals
behave in actual choice experiments.
5 The earnings of entrepreneurs
In this section we look at the wage premium for being an entrepreneur and
the extent to which the high premium is due to barriers to entry.
Tables 2a and 2b show the results of standard hourly earnings regres-
sions. The ￿earnings￿ for self-employed individuals are measured as net
revenue (total revenue net all the input costs as judged by respondents)
16divided by hours worked. Table 2a reports the results for regressions on ab-
solute earnings while Table 2b reports the results for log-earnings. Analyses
for log-earnings are more standard in the literature as they have appealing
rates-of-returns interpretations if that there is no heteroskedasticity. How-
ever, it is well-known that entrepreneurs have much more volatile earnings
than salary-earners (Portes and Zhou 1996; Hamilton, 2000) meaning that
regressions on log-earnings will seriously under-estimate the actual aggregate
di⁄erences in earnings. Thus, the discussion below will focus mainly on Table
2a.
The baseline model includes the following covariates: age and its squared
term, years of schooling, gender and marriage dummy variables, and controls
for city and industry of employment. In addition, we include dummy vari-
ables for entrepreneurs, for migrants, and for the interaction of entrepreneurs
and migrants. This interaction term is essentially a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences
measure of the relative gain migrant entrepreneurs make relative to urban
entrepreneurs.
In both tables, the control variables have the right signs and reasonable
magnitudes. Standardizing for city and industry of employment, there is an
inverse U-shaped age-earnings pro￿le for all the samples. Returns to years of
schooling ranges between 5 to 7% depending on which sample is used. Men
earn around 15 to 24% more than women, and urban workers have a positive
marriage premium.
Turning to the variables of main interest, Table 2a con￿rms many of the
suppositions of the institutional section and the descriptive model. For one,
migrants earn much less than their comparable urban counterparts. The ￿rst
column of the Panel A shows that migrants, after controlling for education,
region, industry, and basic demographics (gender, age, marriage), earn 5.66
less yuan per hour, which is about 75% of the average migrant hourly wage
and 34% of the average urban hourly wage, meaning that the comparable
urban resident earns nearly twice as much. The log-earnings regressions
in Table 2b tell the same story with migrants earning 41% less than their
comparable urban counterparts.
Column 2 of Table 2a shows that migrant entrepreneurs earn about 1.99
yuan more per hour than comparable salary earners, which amounts to about
26% of average migrant hourly earnings and is highly signi￿cant. The com-
parable estimate for urban residents in the third column 1.84 yuan per hour
which is about 11% of average urban hourly earnings and turns out to be
insigni￿cant. In the logarithmic regressions of Table 2b, which ignore the
di⁄erence in log-variance, migrant entrepreneurs earn 5% more than their
salaried counterparts (column 2), showing the importance of taking account
of the di⁄erential variability of earnings in the entrepreneurial sector. We can
17mention that it makes little di⁄erence for the e⁄ects of being an entrepreneur
if we also allow for sector-speci￿c e⁄ects of experience (Hamilton 2000), but
because tenure is quite strongly correlated with age and education we do not
include it in the main regressions.
5.1 Is the high premium for entrepreneurs due to re-
turns to their investment?
One might argue that the high return to entrepreneurs is mainly due to
the fact that the net revenue used to measure entrepreneur earnings has a
return to capital investment component. Fortunately our data allow us to
directly test the degree to which entrepreneurs make excess returns on their
investments. To gauge the presence of excess returns, we estimate the basic
models again, including the real initial investment14 for all the self-employed.
The value of initial investment for wage-salary earners is set to zero and the
results are reported in Panel B of Tables 2a and 2b.
Including real initial investments for the self-employed does not change
the results for any other control variables, meaning that it is not the case
that the initial returns to entrepreneurship were due to an overstatement in
the net revenue: the separate regression for the migrant sample shows that
taking initial investments into account reduces the return to entrepreneurs
from 1.99 yuan per hour to 1.69 yuan per hour, which is still 22% of average
migrant earnings. For the urban sample, the original insigni￿cant e⁄ect
remains insigni￿cant once the initial investment is included.
The return to initial investment is much higher for the migrant sample
than for the urban sample. For every additional 100,000 Yuan initial in-
vestment, a migrant earns 1.2 Yuan per hour more. Given that the average
migrant entrepreneur works about 3900 hours per year (=75*52), this makes
the excess return 4.7% per year. The equivalent point-estimate for the excess
return made by urban entrepreneurs is an insigni￿cant 0.76%. The substan-
tial di⁄erence in excess returns to investment between migrant and urban
local entrepreneurs is an important indication that migrant entrepreneurs
faced stronger credit constraints than the urban entrepreneurs.
14The initial investment is de￿ ated on a series of provincial level CPI with 1995 set to
100. In terms of interpretation, we here think of start-up capital as both a human capital
variable with a return and as a threshold of credit an entrepreneur needs to get started
(i.e. it is taken to be exogenous but with a return).
185.2 Is selectivity important?
A key source of doubt about the found 20-30% earnings di⁄erential between
migrant entrepreneurs and salary earners is the potential selection of en-
trepreneurs on unobservables. The ￿rst check on the importance of ￿ unob-
servables￿is presented in panel C of Tables 2a and 2b. There, we include
self-reported measures of trust, risk-taking, and social networks intended to
control for individual traits important in the value of being an entrepreneur.
As these traits are not controlled for in normal earnings equation estima-
tions , we regard them as part of the ￿ unobservables￿ . As shown in Tables
2a and 2b, inclusion of these ￿ unobservables￿hardly changed the estimate of
the earnings bene￿t of being an entrepreneur: from 1.69 Yuan per hour in
the second column of panel B to 1.66 Yuan per hour in the third column of
panel C. None of the other coe¢ cients change much either, though it can be
noted that risk-taking itself has a positive e⁄ect on earnings at borderline
signi￿cance levels for migrants.
A second check on the importance of unobservables is to use the part
of the sample that is followed over time and to see what the wage increase
is for those who switched from wage-salaried workers to entrepreneurs over
the two years. Due to the very high mobility in the panel and the general
fear of the migrants about being monitored, we have information on only
40% of the sample for both 2008 and 2009. Controlling for individual ￿xed
e⁄ects we ￿nd that those who changed from wage-salary earners in 2008
to self-employed in 2009 on average gained 10 percent in hourly earnings.15
Given the high probability of selectivity bias due to the high attrition rate
for the longitudinal survey and the fact that most of the entrepreneur-related
variables are only available for 2009 and hence cannot be controlled for in
the ￿xed e⁄ect estimation, we see these results more as con￿rmatory than
central.
Another check on selectivity is to ask the migrant entrepreneurs how
much they expect to earn as salaried workers. Presuming that entrepreneurs
know about their own productive characteristics, their answers should be
informative about whether there is something unobserved that makes them
more productive in general or whether their own estimate of the earnings
bene￿t of being an entrepreneur coincides with that of the cross-sectional
di⁄erences. We compare the self-reported hypothetical earnings with the
actual earnings made by entrepreneurs (see in the ￿rst and second rows for
the entrepreneurs and involuntary self-employed columns). The table shows
that on average entrepreneurs currently earn 8.36 Yuan per hour whereas
they expect to earn only 5.63 Yuan per hour if they were a salaried worker,
15These results are available upon request from the authors.
19around 33% lower than the amount they currently report to make. This
counterfactual earnings di⁄erential is even larger than what we observed from
the cross-section data comparison, suggesting that unobserved heterogeneity
in earnings potential is not a likely cause of the observed di⁄erence in earnings
between entrepreneurs and wage-salary earners.
Another check is to allow for di⁄erential returns by estimating wage re-
gressions for entrepreneurs and wage-salary earners separately (reported in
Appendix C) and use the estimated coe¢ cients for wage-salary earners and
entrepreneurs to predict what would have been the earnings for entrepreneurs
and wage-salary earners had they been employed in the alternative sectors,
respectively.16 These comparisons are reported in rows 3 and 4 of Table 3a.
We ￿nd that the amount entrepreneurs are predicted to earn in the salary
sector using regression estimates is 22% less than what they are currently
earning. The average "happy to be" wage-salary earners would have earned
30% higher earnings as entrepreneurs while the want-to-be entrepreneurs
would have earned 40% higher earnings according to our regression estimates.
These results all echo the results of Table 2, in that no di⁄erential rate of
return in observables takes away the basic ￿nding of no less than 22% earnings
premium for becoming an entrepreneur.17
Our last check on the importance of ￿ unobservable￿characteristics relies
on the laboratory tests to ascertain subjects￿IQ scores, their level of trust,
and their risk-taking. Earnings regressions taking those normally unobserved
characteristics into account for the sub-sample of laboratory participants are
reported in Table 3b. There are two noteworthy items about these results.
The ￿rst is that none of the laboratory assessed measures (including risk) are
actually signi￿cant determinants of earnings, although they all have the right
signs. This is obviously unexpected and not in line with studies for other
countries (Blanch￿ ower, 2004). One explanation is that individuals who par-
ticipated in the experiment are a selected group of more risk loving and
trusting people. As a check on the selectivity, we replicated panel C of Ta-
ble 2b for the experimental sample (not shown), i.e. used their self-reported
16We run these separate regressions to allow for the possibility that the rates of return
to certain variables is very di⁄erent across the two groups and that hence some individuals
might have a comparative productivity advantage in one group or the other. As shown in
Appendix C, the rate of return to education is much lower for the self-employed group,
while the returns to risk taking and social networks are much higher. The main group
for which this matters in terms of counterfactuals turns out to be the involuntary self-
employed group.
17Con￿rming the strong selectivity of those who do not want to be entrepreneurs, the
involuntary self-employed are predicted to earn slightly more in the wage-salary sector
partially because of their lack of social networks which are worth a lot as entrepreneurs
but not much as salary earners.
20measures rather than the measures derived from their choice behaviour. It
turned out that the e⁄ects of self-assessed risk and trust measures were sig-
ni￿cantly di⁄erent between the general migrant sample and the experimental
group, con￿rming a selectivity on important unobservables.
The second salient aspect of Table 3b is that the estimates of the e⁄ect
of becoming an entrepreneur on earnings is near identical to those of Table
2a. An entrepreneur is estimated in column 1 to earn 1.91 yuan more than
a salaried individual, dropping to 1.79 yuan when account is taken of IQ,
risk-taking, and trust (column 3). Indeed, the estimated e⁄ect on log-wages
in columns 4 to 6 is higher than the previous estimates of Table 2b. Since
the sample for Table 2 was designed to be representative of the migrant pop-
ulation whilst the laboratory sample is not quite as representative, we prefer
the estimates of Tables 2, but note that, if anything, the laboratory sample
gives even higher estimates of the earnings bene￿t of being an entrepreneur.
The above analysis suggests that although individual heterogeneity may
contribute to some of the observed high returns to entrepreneurs, the large
bulk of those returns cannot be explained by it.
6 The impact of credit constraints on entre-
preneurial choice
If being an entrepreneur brings signi￿cant payo⁄s to migrants, then, what
does it take to become an entrepreneur? In this section we examine what
di⁄erentiates a current entrepreneur from an average wage-salary earner, a
happy-to-be wage-salary earner, and a ￿want-to-be￿ entrepreneur. Given
that migrants have a much higher proportion of current and ￿want-to-be￿
entrepreneurs, the analysis below focuses on the migrant sample.
Echoing the methodology of Blanch￿ ower and Oswald (1998) and the
subsequent literature that has tried to use random ￿ uctuations in wealth to
see if credit constraints matter (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004; and Nanda 2010),
we will use negative ￿nancial events in the previous year to help predict who
is an entrepreneur. The ￿credit constraining￿events in question (marriage
break-downs, illness and death in the family, and building or buying houses)
should have a signi￿cant impact on individuals￿current liquidity as all these
events put strains on the ￿nances of the household and therefore should make
the credit constraint more binding, whilst they should have no direct e⁄ect
on the innate bene￿ts of becoming an entrepreneur. We test the sensitivity
and validity of using these negative events as a proxy for negative ￿nancial
shocks.
21We estimate probit as well as multinomial logit models to examine the
question of what it takes to become an entrepreneur, but given the high
degree of similarity of the results only report the results from the probit
models.
6.1 Comparing entrepreneurs to average wage-salary
earners
We report in column 1 of Panel A of Table 4 the marginal e⁄ects from a probit
model of currently being an entrepreneur versus being a wage-salary earner
(including want-to-be entrepreneurs and happy-to-be wage-salary workers)
for the migrant sample.
The results show that both age and ￿ year since migration￿contribute
signi￿cantly to whether an individual is self-employed or not, with the older
and more established migrants more likely to be entrepreneurs. In addition,
married people, less educated people, and females are more likely to be an
entrepreneur. Each additional year of schooling increases an individual￿ s
probability to be a wage-salary earner by 1.7 percentage points, which re￿ ects
the ￿nding of Appendix C that the relative payo⁄ to education is higher in
the salaried sector than the entrepreneurial sector. The self assessed risk
score does not signi￿cantly predict who is an entrepreneur and who is a
wage-salary earner, though we do observe a positive sign. Both a greater
degree of trust and a larger network increase the probability of being an
entrepreneur. Someone with no network is nearly 15% less likely to be an
entrepreneur than someone with an average size network (25 contacts), i.e.
25*0.006. Someone who believes others can be trusted is 3.9% less likely to
be an entrepreneur.
The value of the house in the home town contributes signi￿cantly posi-
tively to the probability of being an entrepreneur. Every additional 100,000
yuan increase in hometown housing value is associated with a 2 percentage
point increase in the probability of being an entrepreneur. Given that 100,000
yuan corresponds to the 90th percentile of housing values in the hometown,
and the medium value is only 20,000 yuan, this shows that housing wealth
in the countryside has but little e⁄ect on who is an entrepreneur for the
majority of the sample.18
18In fact, our results ￿t in with Hurst and Lusardi￿ s (2004) and Nanda￿ s (2010) ￿nding
that the impact of wealth on the probability to be an entrepreneur is quite non-linear, in
that housing values are highly skewed. We may mention that the functional form of the
e⁄ect of housing values does not matter, in that including higher order polynomial terms
does not change the other e⁄ects.
22The most interesting ￿nding here is that the credit constraining events
have a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on the probability of entrepreneurship. On
average, an individual having had any of the four events occur in the past year
is 3.1 % less likely to be an entrepreneur this year. This is a considerable e⁄ect
taking into account that the average proportion of current entrepreneurs is
just 23% of the total migrant workforce.
6.2 Comparing entrepreneurs to happy-to-be wage-salary
earners
Column 2 of Panel A compares the current entrepreneurs to the ￿happy-
to-be￿wage-salary earners, hence excluding the ￿want-to-be￿entrepreneurs
from the group of salaried workers to see if the results of column 1 are con-
taminated by the presence of credit constrained individuals in the group of
salaried workers.
By and large, the di⁄erences between column 1 and 2 of Panel A are small.
There are no sign reversals and most of the e⁄ects that were signi￿cant stayed
signi￿cant. Two exceptions are worth mentioning. The ￿rst is that the e⁄ect
of gender has virtually disappeared: whereas men were 2% less likely to be
entrepreneurs and hence 2% more likely to be salary earners in column 1
(Panel A), men are only 0.7% less likely to be entrepreneurs than ￿happy-to-
be￿salary earners. This indicates that the excluded group of ￿want-to-be￿
entrepreneurs is disproportionately male. The other exception is that the
credit constraining events are no longer signi￿cant, which is what one would
expect because we have now excluded the group that have been prevented
from becoming an entrepreneur due to the negative ￿nancial shocks.
6.3 The want-to-be entrepreneurs
The ￿nal two columns (columns 3 and 4) in Panel A compare the observed
characteristics of ￿want-to-be￿entrepreneurs with current entrepreneurs (col-
umn 3); and with their happy-to-be wage-salary earning counterparts (col-
umn 4 of Panel A).
The results from column 3 in Panel A show that an extra year of education
makes a person 2.5% more likely to be a ￿want-to-be￿entrepreneur rather
than an actual entrepreneur. As expected from the previous column, males
are much more likely to be ￿want-to-be￿entrepreneurs than entrepreneurs.
Interestingly, self-assessed risk-taking has no independent e⁄ect, showing that
the aggregate di⁄erences in risk-taking between these groups found in Table
1 is indeed mainly a function of the other sources of selection (age, gender,
and initial wealth).
23Most importantly, our ￿want-to-be￿group seems to be much more credit
constrained: a credit constraining event makes it 10.6% more likely to be
a ￿want-to-be￿entrepreneur than a current entrepreneur. In addition, the
value of the hometown house has a greater e⁄ect on the probability of being
an entrepreneur than any other comparison group, consistent with the idea
that credit constraints are relatively important for this group.
Thus, with regard to the characteristics which were commonly found to
be important in becoming an entrepreneur, we ￿nd that the ￿want-to-be￿
entrepreneurs are equally risk loving, have an equally large social network in
the city they lived in, and are more educated. The most important di⁄erence
is that the want-to-be entrepreneurs are more likely to have su⁄ered from a
credit constraining event than the entrepreneurs.
Column 4 of Panel A is in a sense the mirror image of the previous
columns. The most important ￿nding is that ￿want-to-be￿entrepreneurs are
more likely to have had credit constraining events than happy-to-be salary
earners. As a causal factor this would make little sense (why would an illness
in the family make you more likely to want to be an entrepreneur?), but it
makes immediate sense if it were true that those who did not su⁄er from
such an event were more likely to have already become entrepreneurs.
6.4 Sensitivity tests for credit-constraining events
There are important endogeneity concerns with the analysis above. Our ￿rst
worry is that some of the events used may not be very random. For example,
building or buying a house in the hometown and having a marriage break-
down are to some extent forward-looking choices that may re￿ ect anticipated
stable future income streams. Also, one can argue that one should not use a
dummy of whether any of the four events happened but rather a cumulative
index.
To test whether our results so far hinge on the way we measure the credit-
constraining events, we construct ￿ve alternative measures and report the
results in Table 5. The ￿rst measure uses all four events listed above but
instead of using a dummy variable for the presence of at least one event, we
use the number of the events that occurred (row 1 of Table 5). The second
and third measures exclude ￿built or bought a new house at hometown￿from
the measure and uses both ￿any event￿dummy (row 2) and number of events
(row 3); whereas the fourth and ￿fth measures further exclude ￿divorced or
separated in the past year￿and again measures it using the dummy (row 4)
and number of events (row 5).
We can focus still more precisely on those life events that are a random
shock to wealth by using additional information in the survey on whether
24the events were expected or not. When we count only those events that
are self-reported as being unexpected, we get the results in rows 6 to 8 of
Table 5. When we count only unexpected events, the e⁄ects of the life events
becomes stronger than before. For example, with the ￿ any of the two events￿
measure (row 4), those who experienced the events are 10 percent less likely
to become entrepreneurs, while using only the unexpected events increases
the e⁄ect to 15 percent (row 8).
Finally we use as additional controls the number of months in continuous
employment (in order to allow for interruptions to work) in the current city
for the last year and current mental health (in order to allow for reverse
causality), which is derived from the 12-item General Health Questionnaire
(GHQ). Following the standard approach in the literature we sum the 12
GHQ responses (GHQ12) to form an index ranging from 0 to 36 (called the
Likert scale), with 0 representing the highest level of mental health and 36
representing the lowest level.19 The results presented in row 9 of Table 5
show that including these two additional variables makes little di⁄erence to
the estimated impact of life-events.
The results shown in Table 5 provide a very consistent pattern in that
having the events occur in the past year has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on whether
an individual is more likely to be an entrepreneur or not for the happy-to-be
wage-salary earners, no matter how the events are measured. Yet, the credit-
constraining events always make it less likely to be an entrepreneur for the
want-to-be entrepreneur group, no matter how we measure the events. In
fact, the e⁄ect becomes stronger when only the most random events (serious
illness in the family and death in the family) are included and individuals￿
current mental health status and the length of continuous employment in the
cities are controlled for.
7 Credit constraints and welfare implications
In this section we investigate the extent to which ￿want-to-be￿entrepreneurs
are credit constrained, and the welfare implications of the credit constraints.
In the survey we explicitly ask the ￿want-to-be￿ entrepreneurs the initial
investment required for the type of business they wish to establish and how
much they think they could borrow for the initial investment from formal
and informal ￿nancial institutions, and relatives and friends. For the current
19The GHQ12 is commonly used by medical researchers, epidemiologists, and econo-
mists as a measure of psychological distress (see Blanch￿ ower and Oswald, 2008; Jones
and Wildman, 2008; and Madden, 2009 for recent economics applications). The detailed
questions of the GHQ12 asked in the RUMiCI survey are presented in Appendix A.
25entrepreneurs we also inquired into their level of initial investment and the
total amount borrowed from formal and informal channels.
7.1 Levels of credit constraints
The ￿rst row of Table 6 presents the average total amount of the anticipated
investment required for the ￿want-to-be￿entrepreneurs and the actual initial
investment for the current entrepreneurs. The initial investment of the cur-
rent entrepreneurs have been adjusted for the cumulative in￿ ation since the
starting year so that they are comparable with current anticipated invest-
ment, but given the consistent 10% economic growth in China in the last few
decades it would be reasonable to expect the amount of initial investment
needed to have grown faster than in￿ ation.
The ￿rst column in Table 6 shows that on average the level of investment
the want-to-be entrepreneurs report to need is around 1.6 times higher than
the average amount the current entrepreneurs actually invested at the start
of their business. One reason for this discrepancy is the gradual increase in
investments and the fact that we are comparing current want-to-be entre-
preneurs with all the current entrepreneurs, a large number of whom started
their business many years ago. If we instead look at the 68 individuals who
started their business in 2009, the average level of initial investment is 50,425
yuan, which is only slightly higher than the medium value of the ￿want-to-
be￿entrepreneur group￿ s anticipated initial investment but still nearly three
times the average migrant yearly income. The remaining discrepancy con-
curs with prediction 4 of our initial model, which is that those migrants who
become entrepreneurs are more likely to have had relatively modest needs in
terms of starting capital.
Figure 2 presents the distribution of the anticipated and actual investment
for the two groups, which shows that the mean value di⁄erence is not driven
by extreme values, though the distributions do look quite di⁄erent. Whereas
the actual investments are more continuously distributed around their mean,
the distribution of anticipated investment is lumpy with particular peaks just
around 50,000 yuan (or 10.81 log points), which is the medium value, and
again around 100,000 yuan (11.51 log points), which is the 75th percentile in
the distribution. The anticipated investment has a markedly lower variance.
The reason that the distribution of the actual initial investment is more
variable than the anticipated initial investment may be because the former
occurred over more years but it seems likely that there is some degree of
anticipation error involved too. The top left panel of Figure 3 shows the
locally weighted regression plot of the evolution of actual initial investments
by year of the start of the business. The top left panel reveals that there is
26more than 100 percent increase in the level of initial investment since 1995.
The next four rows of Table 6 report the proportion of the investment
(anticipated or actual) that was (or could be) borrowed from the formal and
informal ￿nancial institutions and from relatives and friends.
On average, the current entrepreneurs borrowed a signi￿cantly lower pro-
portion of their initial investment from all channels than their ￿want-to-be￿
counterparts anticipate being able to borrow. This could be due partially
to the di⁄erence in timing of the investment. Over the past 10 to 15 years,
￿nancial markets in China have expanded and have started to lend to private
￿rms and individuals (see, for example, Farrell and Lund, 2006). Similarly, as
the economy grows, individuals become richer and have more collateral with
which to get loans from relatives, friends, and institutions. Nevertheless, it
may also indicate individuals￿anticipation errors.
The top right panel of Figure 3 shows the percentage of the initial in-
vestment that was reportedly borrowed from formal ￿nancial institutions,
increasing from no more than 1% in 1995 to still less than 5% in 2009. The
bottom left panel shows the proportion borrowed from informal channels,
relatives and friends, which increased in the late 1990 from 7% to 13%, but
has since been on a slow decline to about 12% in 2009. The ￿nal panel on
the bottom left shows the total proportion of the initial investment that was
borrowed, increasing from a low of 12% in 1995 to the current high of 23%
in 2009. Hence the proportions that can be borrowed have indeed increased,
though for all periods it is clear that the vast bulk of the initial investment
was not ￿nanced by borrowing but from savings, a direct indication of the
actual di¢ culties of borrowing money.
The summary ￿nding of Table 6 is that on average, the currently want-to-
be entrepreneurs believe that they can borrow 12% of their initial investment
from the formal ￿nancial institutions and 31% from other sources, while our
data on actual borrowing suggest they would only be able to borrow 5% from
formal institutions and no more than 15% informally. Another way to put
this is that the ￿want-to-be￿entrepreneurs themselves think they need to
come up with around 60% of their anticipated initial investment, whereas
history would suggest they need 80%. This is an average of 51,000 to 70,000
yuan from their own savings. If we consider that this group on average
earns 19,776 yuan per year (see Table 1), the savings required for the initial
investment is equivalent to 2.6 to 3.5 years of total earnings.
To further assess whether the required level of investment anticipated by
the want-to-be entrepreneurs is reasonable, we ran regressions of the determi-
nants of log anticipated/actual initial investment.20 The results are presented
20The additional control variables for the current entrepreneur group are a vector of
27in the ￿rst two columns of Table 7.
In Table 7, the determinants of log initial investments are very similar to
that of log anticipated investments. The one clear exception to the general
rule that whatever signi￿cantly a⁄ects actual investments also a⁄ects antici-
pated investments is the role of gender. Whilst males anticipate needing 19%
higher initial investments than females, current male entrepreneurs report to
have needed 7.5% less than female entrepreneurs. The most probable expla-
nation is that men exaggerate, on average, how much investments they need,
possibly hoping to impress the survey conductor
Otherwise, those who are more risk-loving expect to need and have ac-
tually needed higher initial investments; the more educated report to need
and have needed higher initial investments; and those with more valuable
hometown houses report to need and have needed higher initial investments.
One remaining question is whether the shortfall in the amount one can
borrow is a⁄ected by whether there were credit-constraining events in the
past year. To examine this issue, we estimate an equation on the level of
the di⁄erence between investment required and the amount that is expected
to be borrowed. The results of the OLS and Tobit model are reported in
columns 3 and 4 of Table 7, respectively. Controlling for all the individual
characteristics included in other regressions and standardizing the initial in-
vestment required, we ￿nd that those with credit-constraining events have
an additional gap of 5454 to 6290 yuan in their investment, depending on
the estimation method used. This is about 10% of the total investment
needed and seems to further con￿rm that the events we use are indeed credit
constraining.
7.2 Welfare implications
The total amount of additional income that can be earned by migrants in





where S = fwant-to-be entrepreneurg: In order to calculate this number, we
have to generate a counter-factual for wi;en: We can take three approaches to
this, re￿ ecting the di⁄erent hourly return estimates:
1. A conservative assumption would be that the only di⁄erence between
sectors is the earnings levels for non-Urban Hukou holders, whilst there
dummy variables indicating the year the business was ￿rst started, using 1995 and before
as the omitted category.
28is no di⁄erence in the returns to any skill. We can then take the most
conservative measure of wage di⁄erentials we have found in Table 2b
(1.656 yuan) as a guide for the production increase available to "want-
to-be" entrepreneurs when they become actual entrepreneurs. The
average"want-to-be" entrepreneur can expect a yearly income increase
of around 6210 Yuan assuming that they would work 75 hours a week
(same as the average hours worked by the current entrepreneurs, see
Table 1a) and 50 weeks a year (=75 hours * 1.656 yuan * 50 weeks).
Table 8 shows that this equates to 28.4% of average migrant yearly
earnings. Given that 22.7% of migrants are in the want-to-be entrepre-
neur category, this in turn equates to an average increase in migrant
earnings of 6.5%. If we then allow for the fact that migrants make up
about one third of the urban labour force and that the average migrant
earns 68% (=1822/2667) of an urban resident, then the 6.5% increase
per migrant equates to a 2.1% increase in the total amount of earnings
for all workers in the cities, which is about 1.0% of GDP assuming that
the share of labour in GDP is about 50% in China (which is close to
the share found by Li, Liu, and Wang, 2009).
2. (some selection) Next, we can allow for di⁄erential rates of returns
to skill and hence a greater degree of selectivity of the want-to-be-
entrepreneurs. We thus take d wi;en ￿ wi;sa = x0
ib ￿en ￿ x0
i￿sa from the
separate earnings regressions for entrepreneurs and want-to-be entre-
preneurs in Appendix A. In that case, the average income-increase is
4.29 Yuan per hour, translating to a 16.7% increase in migrant wages,
which is a 5.6% increase in total urban earnings, and roughly 2.8% of
GDP.
3. (structural) Finally, we can allow for both di⁄erential rates of return
and individual unobserved heterogeneity by using the prediction of the
want-to-be entrepreneurs themselves. Under rational expectations, this
should be free of any systematic bias or error in modelling approach.
From Table 3a we know that the average expected self-reported hourly
earnings increase is 3.01 Yuan (=10.34-7.33), which translates to a 3.9%
increase in total urban earnings and roughly 2% of GDP.
The bene￿ts of overcoming credit constraints are thus found to be 1%
to 2.8% of GDP. The true e⁄ect could be higher due to spill-overs of entre-
preneurial activities and lower due to general equilibrium e⁄ects. Positive
spill-overs that relate entrepreneurship to general development have often
been argued to exist (Banerjee and Newman 1993). Glaeser (2007) for in-
stance found that a high density of entrepreneurs in the U.S. is related to the
29subsequent growth of the urban economy, whilst for the whole of the OECD
entrepreneurial density has been related to positive knowledge spill-overs and
higher growth-rates of whole economies (Praag and Versloot, 2007).
Alternatively, if we re￿ ect on the likely general equilibrium e⁄ects of hav-
ing a large additional in￿ ux of self-employed people as well as a large reduc-
tion in the number of salaried workers, we should expect a reduction in the
wage premium of being self-employed and an increase in the wages of the
salaried workers. Under any constant-returns to scale societal production
function, the net e⁄ect of these changes will be less than the partial increase
in wages of the a⁄ected group.21
7.3 Does more discrimination beget more potential en-
trepreneurs?
A direct prediction from our simple model was that the higher the relative
degree of discrimination, the more individuals would want to become entre-
preneurs. Particularly if there are positive spillover e⁄ects of entrepreneurs,
this mechanism can lead to a perverse positive e⁄ect of outright discrimina-
tion of a particular group (migrants). In order to explore this further, we use
the fact that we have 15 cities in our sample that di⁄er with respect to how
they treat migrants. In some cities, migrants are more restricted in which
jobs they can undertake in the formal sector than in other cities. In order
to see if discrimination is truly a push-factor, we estimate wage-regressions
that allow for a di⁄erent e⁄ect of Urban Hukou in the salaried sector for
each city. The coe¢ cients on the migrant dummy variable (which we will
take as the measure of discrimination) for each city are presented in the ￿rst
two columns of Panel A in Table 9, whereas the proportion of the salaried
migrant workforce who are want-to-be entrepreneurs and the proportion of
total migrants who are either entrepreneurs or want-to-be entrepreneurs are
listed in columns 3 and 4 of the Panel A.
Panel B of Table 9 presents two regression results. The ￿rst row of this
panel shows the e⁄ect of di⁄erential treatment on the proportion of migrant
salary workers who want to be entrepreneurs. The result shows that a 1% in-
21The precise assumptions on the nature of the discrimination also matter. If we in-
terpret the discrimination as an avoidable loss of productivity due to entry barriers into
the more productive jobs within the salaried sector, then overcoming the discrimination
via the competitive pressures of free-entry into the entrepreneurial sector would itself be
worth about 3% of GDP (the 40% wage di⁄erential times the 77% of non-entrepreneurs).
If, on the other hand, the discrimination takes the form of pure rents that are monop-
olised by the urban workers, there is no additional production bene￿t from dismantling
discrimination.
30crease in the gap between the earnings of migrants and Urban Hukou holders
in the salaried sector increases the proportion of wage-earning migrants that
wants to be entrepreneurs by 0.4% (signi￿cant at the 0.01 level). The second
row shows that the combined proportion of entrepreneurs and want-to-be
entrepreneurs goes up by 0.22% with every 1% increase in the unexplained
earnings gap between migrants and urban workers, though this is only bor-
derline signi￿cant. Although somewhat tentative, these results do suggest
that discrimination is a push-factor for migrants. It would then be the case
that a complete removal of discriminatory treatment between migrants and
Urban Hukou holders, which would increase the log-wages of the migrants by
0.409 (see Table 2b), would reduce the proportion of salaried migrants that
want to be entrepreneurs by 16.4% (=0.403*0.409). This is a reduction by
about one third of all current and want-to-be entrepreneurs.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we examine whether and how credit constraints are preventing
rural-to-urban migrants in China from becoming entrepreneurs. We found
that current migrants earn about 25% more as entrepreneurs than compa-
rable migrants in the salaried sector. Current entrepreneurs expect a 30%
pay drop should they become salary earners again. Even accounting for
laboratory-measured risk attitudes, IQ, level of trust, and length of job tenure
yields a similar level of a 20% anticipated increase in hourly earnings when
becoming an entrepreneur.
When asked, current want-to-be entrepreneurs expect to need about 2.5
years of total yearly income as initial investment, coinciding with the nearly
2.5 years of income that the 68 migrants who became entrepreneurs in 2009
needed. Want-to-be entrepreneurs expect to be able to borrow no more
than 40% of this initial sum, whereas the actual entrepreneurs have, even
in recent years, been able to borrow no more than 25%, mostly from family
and friends. The estimated excess return to initial investments is 4.7% for
migrants, though less than 1% for urban entrepreneurs, consistent with the
idea that the migrant entrepreneurs are more credit constrained. Want-
to-be entrepreneurs also turn out to be about 25% more likely than actual
entrepreneurs or non-entrepreneurs to have experienced a credit constraining
event in the previous year, such as the death of a family member.
In all, our paper gives credence to the idea that formal ￿nancial insti-
tutions are still in an embryonic stage of development in Chinese cities and
that want-to-be entrepreneurs have to rely on their savings and their contacts
to raise the capital they need to become entrepreneurs. As a result of the
31credit constraints, there are about as many salaried migrants who want to be
entrepreneurs but who haven￿ t yet got su¢ cient savings as there are actual
migrant entrepreneurs: both make up about a quarter of the total popu-
lation of migrant workers in the cities. Our partial equilibrium estimate is
that GDP would increase by about 1% to 2.8% per year if all the want-to-be
entrepreneurs did not face the credit constraints they do, though this ￿gure
might be considerably less if the earnings of entrepreneurs were to drop with
a doubling of their numbers.
Short-term policy measures that could make a di⁄erence include ￿nancial
reforms such that migrants would be able to use collateral in the countryside
to borrow in the cities, as well as making it easier for migrants to stay in
the cities long-term so that they can build the networks via which they can
borrow more and attain the permits they need to become entrepreneurs.
Our paper also points to a, perhaps unanticipated, economic ￿ bene￿t￿
from legalized discrimination of migrants in urban areas: being barred from
many of the more desirable jobs in the formal sector makes being an en-
trepreneur a more attractive proposition. We found that a 1% increase in
the gap between the earnings of migrants and Urban Hukou holders in the
salaried sector increases the proportion of wage-earning migrants that want
to be an entrepreneur by 0.4% and that perhaps up to a third of the current
and want-to-be entrepreneurs would cease to want to be an entrepreneur in
the absence of discrimination.
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Happy to be 
wage-salary 
earners
Distribution in each group (%) 23.02 5.04 22.7 49.24 6789
Weekly hours worked (hours) 77.08 79.33 58.39 56.81 62.97
Weekly hours (top coded) (hours) 75.22 76.38 58.28 56.67 62.30
Monthly wage/net revenue (yuan) 2410 1760 1648 1633 1822
Hourly wage/net revenue (yuan) 8.36 6.13 7.33 7.42 7.55
Age 35.90 36.88 28.33 31.21 31.92
Years of schooling 8.38 8.23 9.83 9.50 9.26
Year since migration 8.74 8.55 5.74 6.20 6.80
% being males 57.39 52.92 65.41 59.53 60.04
Self assessed risk 2.88 2.60 4.16 3.26 3.34
% indicated most people can be trusted 38.13 33.92 50.86 47.95 45.60
Size of network 24.46 22.27 28.35 23.37 24.70
    Of which: # living in the same city 10.85 9.38 13.48 10.53 11.21
% had credit constraining events 11.45 15.79 15.44 11.10 12.40
Self-employed real initial investment (yuan) 28570 29377
Hometown housing value (yuan) 53611 35295 50531 50193 50306
Industry distribution: % % % % Freq.
Construction 3.01 3.80 7.40 11.01 542
Manufacturing 3.84 4.09 24.59 25.99 1322
Retail/wholesale 64.24 66.96 19.99 15.82 2070
Services 24.06 22.81 36.15 35.84 2209
High tech-edu 4.41 2.05 4.61 4.88 310
Finance-insurance 0.00 0.29 6.88 6.10 311
Other 0.45 0.00 0.39 0.36 25









Distribution in each group (%) 8.00 0.77 3.35 87.88 6487
Weekly hours worked (hours) 56.93 55.86 44.74 42.41 43.75
Weekly hours (top coded) (hours) 56.85 55.86 44.74 42.41 43.75
Monthly wage/net revenue (yuan) 3232 2468 2399 2628 2667
Hourly wage/net revenue (yuan) 15.83 11.59 14.22 16.77 16.58
Age 41.62 40.22 35.35 40.58 40.48
Years of schooling 10.42 10.20 12.70 12.44 12.27
% being males 61.08 54.00 60.37 56.10 56.61
Self assessed risk 1.92 2.36 2.83 1.63 1.70
% indicated most people can be trusted 49.52 56.00 51.61 45.92 46.54
Size of network 31.32 36.46 43.11 34.21 34.29
    Of which: # living in the same city 23.32 25.98 32.39 27.19 27.05
% had credit constraining events 4.05 4.00 3.23 3.47 3.51
Self-employed real initial investment (yuan) 31458 13703
Industry distribution: % % % % Freq.
Construction 5.39 0.00 6.91 3.75 257
Manufacturing 11.37 6.00 14.29 22.03 1349
Retail/wholesale 44.32 34.00 14.75 10.47 876
Services 33.14 56.00 46.08 43.71 2792
High tech-edu 3.47 2.00 7.37 12.95 773
Finance-insurance 1.16 2.00 8.76 5.40 334
Other 1.16 0.00 1.84 1.68 106
Currently self-employed Current wage-salary earners Total






Happy to be wage-
salary earners
Distribution in each group (%) 15.51 5.17 28.50 50.81 1663
Weekly hours worked (hours) 76.76 80.66 57.36 54.91 60.33
Weekly hours (top coded) (hours) 75.05 77.57 57.30 54.82 59.84
Monthly wage/net revenue (yuan) 2300 1567 1717 1660 1771
Hourly wage/net revenue (yuan) 7.91 4.94 7.63 7.82 7.63
Age 35.67 37.07 27.11 30.21 30.53
Years of schooling 8.65 8.19 10.14 9.91 9.69
Year since migration 8.26 7.78 5.63 6.07 6.37
% being males 66.28 62.79 69.62 64.02 65.90
Self assessed risk 3.84 3.37 4.79 4.13 4.24
% indicated most people can be trusted 50.78 48.84 58.02 55.74 55.26
Size of network 25.20 22.15 28.66 24.48 25.66
    Of which: # living in the same city 10.44 7.81 14.00 10.77 11.49
% had credit constraining events 11.24 16.28 14.77 11.24 12.51
Self-employed Initial investment (yuan) 34339 57499
Hometown housing value (yuan) 56159 34217 50831 46802 48751
Industry distribution: % % % % Freq.
Construction 3.01 3.80 7.40 11.01 542
Manufacturing 3.84 4.09 24.59 25.99 1322
Retail/wholesale 64.24 66.96 19.99 15.82 2070
Services 24.06 22.81 36.15 35.84 2209
High tech-edu 4.41 2.05 4.61 4.88 310
Finance-insurance 0.00 0.29 6.88 6.10 311
Other 0.45 0.00 0.39 0.36 25
Table 1B: Summary Statistics for the experimental sample
Currently self-employed Current wage-salary earners Total
40Total Migrants Urban  Total Migrants Urban  Total Migrants Urban 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Age 0.232 0.361 0.822 0.225 0.353 0.820 0.253 0.355 0.859
[0.115]** [0.068]*** [0.268]*** [0.116]* [0.068]*** [0.268]*** [0.116]** [0.068]*** [0.271]***
Age2 -0.003 -0.005 -0.009 -0.003 -0.005 -0.009 -0.003 -0.005 -0.009
[0.001]* [0.001]*** [0.003]*** [0.001]* [0.001]*** [0.003]*** [0.001]** [0.001]*** [0.003]***
Years of schooling 0.926 0.390 1.239 0.924 0.386 1.239 0.878 0.349 1.193
[0.058]*** [0.039]*** [0.102]*** [0.058]*** [0.039]*** [0.102]*** [0.059]*** [0.039]*** [0.103]***
Dummy for males 2.618 1.648 4.034 2.596 1.600 4.030 2.590 1.528 4.027
[0.327]*** [0.196]*** [0.625]*** [0.327]*** [0.195]*** [0.625]*** [0.329]*** [0.195]*** [0.641]***
Dummy for married 2.182 0.314 2.652 2.185 0.300 2.656 2.075 0.383 2.421
[0.503]*** [0.284] [1.036]** [0.504]*** [0.283] [1.036]** [0.504]*** [0.285] [1.041]**
Dummy for migrants -5.655 -5.687 -5.264
[0.447]*** [0.448]*** [0.476]***
Dummy for entrepreneurs 1.188 1.986 1.841 0.915 1.693 1.755 0.980 1.656 1.835
[0.843] [0.254]*** [1.171] [0.849] [0.256]*** [1.191] [0.847] [0.255]*** [1.192]
Dummy for mig*entrepreneurs 1.613 1.684 1.552
[0.989] [0.991]* [0.989]
Real Initial investment/10
5 0.892 1.208 0.254 0.851 1.190 0.186
[0.295]*** [0.155]*** [0.658] [0.294]*** [0.154]*** [0.658]
Risk loving 0.087 0.076 0.002
[0.074] [0.041]* [0.161]
Trusting -0.043 0.192 -0.232
[0.399] [0.207] [0.933]
Size of the social network in the city 0.045 0.048 0.043
[0.007]*** [0.006]*** [0.011]***
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13280 6789 6491 13280 6789 6491 13280 6789 6491
R-squared 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.09
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Standard errors in brackets.
Panel A: Baseline model Panel B: Baseline+ initial investment
Panel C: Baseline+initial 
invst.+(risk_trust_network)
Table 2A: Earnings equations (hourly earnings)
Note:  (1) The level of initial investment is in real terms using provincial CPI (1995=100); (2) missing values for risk and network are set to zero and the dummy variables for 
those missing value observations are included in the regression. (3) hours are top coded at 91 hours per week ( 13 hours daily, 7 days a week).
41Total Migrants Urban  Total Migrants Urban  Total Migrants Urban 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Age 0.027 0.050 0.050 0.027 0.049 0.050 0.029 0.049 0.052
[0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.007]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.007]*** [0.004]*** [0.005]*** [0.007]***
Age2 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Years of schooling 0.063 0.048 0.072 0.063 0.048 0.072 0.060 0.046 0.068
[0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.003]***
Dummy for males 0.190 0.150 0.243 0.189 0.147 0.243 0.183 0.141 0.232
[0.011]*** [0.015]*** [0.017]*** [0.011]*** [0.015]*** [0.017]*** [0.011]*** [0.015]*** [0.017]***
Dummy for married 0.109 0.018 0.160 0.109 0.016 0.160 0.104 0.025 0.144
[0.017]*** [0.021] [0.028]*** [0.017]*** [0.021] [0.028]*** [0.017]*** [0.021] [0.028]***
Dummy for migrants -0.409 -0.412 -0.385
[0.016]*** [0.016]*** [0.016]***
Dummy for entrepreneurs -0.012 0.052 0.020 -0.032 0.033 0.007 -0.027 0.030 0.013
[0.029] [0.019]*** [0.032] [0.029] [0.019]* [0.032] [0.029] [0.019] [0.032]
Dummy for migrants*entrepreneurs 0.081 0.086 0.077
[0.034]** [0.034]** [0.034]**
Initial investment/10
5 0.066 0.078 0.038 0.062 0.077 0.032
[0.010]*** [0.012]*** [0.018]** [0.010]*** [0.012]*** [0.018]*
Risk loving 0.015 0.008 0.017
[0.003]*** [0.003]** [0.004]***
Trusting 0.020 0.003 0.070
[0.014] [0.016] [0.025]***
Size of the social network in the city 0.003 0.003 0.003
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13280 6789 6491 13280 6789 6491 13280 6789 6491
R-squared 0.36 0.21 0.29 0.36 0.21 0.30 0.37 0.22 0.31
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Standard errors in brackets.
Panel A: Baseline model Panel B: Baseline+ initial investment
Panel C: Baseline+initial 
invst.+(risk_trust_network)
Note:  (1) The level of initial investment is in real terms using provincial CPI (1995=100); (2) missing values for risk and network are set to zero and the dummy variables for 
those missing value observations are included in the regression. (3) hours are top coded at 91 hours per week ( 13 hours daily, 7 days a week).
Table 2B: Earnings equations (log hourly earnings)
42Mean % of actual  Mean % of actual  Mean % of actual  Mean % of actual 
[1] Actual 8.36 6.13 7.33 7.42
(13.60) (6.21) (5.22) (4.63)
[2] Own est. of earnings as wage-salary earners 5.63 67.38 5.64 92.03
(14.98) (12.57)
[3] Predicted hourly earnings (self-employed) 10.34 141.13 9.82 132.43
(5.94) (5.16)







Happy to be wage-salary 
earners
Table 3a: Actual and predicted absolute earnings
Note: Standard diviations are reported in parentheses.
43Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age/10 0.249 0.247 0.249 0.039 0.039 0.039
[0.087]*** [0.087]*** [0.087]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]*** [0.009]***
(Age/10)
2 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Years of schooling 0.455 0.452 0.422 0.052 0.052 0.047
[0.051]*** [0.051]*** [0.053]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.006]***
Dummy for males 1.021 0.998 0.970 0.124 0.122 0.118
[0.264]*** [0.264]*** [0.268]*** [0.028]*** [0.028]*** [0.029]***
Dummy for married 0.711 0.685 0.704 0.056 0.053 0.056
[0.346]** [0.345]** [0.345]** [0.037] [0.037] [0.037]
Dummy for entrepreneurs 1.914 1.801 1.798 0.130 0.119 0.120
[0.369]*** [0.372]*** [0.372]*** [0.039]*** [0.040]*** [0.040]***
Real initial investment/10
5 0.511 0.501 0.043 0.042
[0.140]*** [0.140]*** [0.015]*** [0.015]***






Size of social network in cities 0.021 0.003
[0.008]*** [0.001]***
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1662 1662 1662 1662 1662 1662
R-squared 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.28 0.28 0.29
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Standard errors in brackets.
Hourly earnings (yuan) Log (hourly earnings)
Table 3b: Earnings equations for the experimental sample
Note:  (1) The level of initial investment is in real terms using provincial CPI (1995=100); (2) hours are top coded at 91 hours per week ( 13 hours 













[1] [2] [3] [4]
Age/10 0.261*** 0.322*** 0.377*** 0.143**
[0.041] [0.054] [0.089] [0.056]
(Age/10)
2 -0.033*** -0.043*** -0.037*** -0.030***
[0.005] [0.007] [0.012] [0.008]
Year since migration/10 0.151*** 0.194*** 0.179*** 0.023
[0.024] [0.032] [0.051] [0.034]
(Year since migration/10)
2 -0.048*** -0.064*** -0.052** -0.015
[0.010] [0.013] [0.022] [0.015]
Year of schooling -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.025*** 0.003
[0.002] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003]
Dummy for males -0.020* -0.007 -0.069*** 0.043***
[0.011] [0.014] [0.022] [0.014]
Dummy for married 0.161*** 0.216*** 0.258*** 0.027
[0.014] [0.018] [0.029] [0.020]
Self assessed risk 0.003 0.008** -0.006 0.017***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003]
Believe most people can be trusted -0.039*** -0.059*** -0.046** -0.037**
[0.012] [0.016] [0.023] [0.015]
Network in cities 0.006* 0.012** 0.002 0.011***
[0.003] [0.005] [0.007] [0.004]
Hometown housing value/10
4 0.002*** 0.002** 0.003** -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Credit constraining events -0.031** -0.023 -0.106*** 0.064***
[0.014] [0.021] [0.030] [0.021]
City dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6471 4928 3117 4897
Pseudo R-squared 0.20 0.19 0.28 0.07
LR Chi2 1402.97 1194.96 1203.60 443.00
Panel B: Controlling for mental health and length of time worked continously last year in the city:
Credit constraining events -0.029** -0.022 -0.102*** 0.061***
[0.014] [0.021] [0.030] [0.021]
Mental health -0.002 -0.001 -0.008*** 0.006***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
# of months  worked last year in the city 0.013*** 0.018*** 0.014* 0.005
[0.004] [0.005] [0.008] [0.004]
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Self assessed risk (higher the value, more risk loving)
Table 4: Marginal effects from probit estimations 








[1] No. of four events occurred in the past year -0.027** -0.018 -0.093*** 0.055***
[0.013] [0.018] [0.024] [0.016]
[2] Any of the three events occurred in the past year -0.018 -0.006 -0.086** 0.054**
[0.018] [0.025] [0.036] [0.026]
[3] No. of the three events occurred in the past year -0.022 -0.010 -0.093*** 0.055**
[0.016] [0.023] [0.032] [0.021]
[4] Any of the two events occurred in the past year -0.017 0.000 -0.100*** 0.072***
[0.018] [0.026] [0.036] [0.027]
[5] No. of the two events occurred in the past year -0.021 -0.004 -0.102*** 0.069***
[0.017] [0.024] [0.033] [0.022]
Unexpected events:
[6] Any of the 4 event occured, all unexpected -0.033 -0.023 -0.127*** 0.080**
[0.020] [0.030] [0.041] [0.032]
[7] Any of the 3 event occured, all unexpected -0.039* -0.027 -0.145*** 0.089***
[0.021] [0.032] [0.042] [0.033]
[8] Any of the 2 event occured, all unexpected -0.040* -0.027 -0.150*** 0.097***
[0.021] [0.032] [0.042] [0.034]
Observations 6471 4928 3117 4897
Control for mental health and length of worked
[9] Any of the 2 event occured, all unexpected -0.041** -0.030 -0.152*** 0.095***
[0.021] [0.032] [0.042] [0.034]
Observations 6471 4928 3117 4897
Note: 1. "four events" including: 1) marriage breakdown; 2) serious illness in the family; 3) death in the family; and 4) built or bought new house.
            2. "three events" exclude "built or bought new house" from the credit-constraint-related events. 
            3. "two events" further exclude "marriage breakdown" from the credit-constraint-related events.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in brackets
Table 5: Tests of sensitivity on alternative credit-constraining event measures
46mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Level of initial investment (yuan) 88310 109712 34723 98179 50425 108050
% can be borrowed from formal financial instit. 0.12 0.20 0.02 0.11 0.04 0.19
% can be borrowed from informal financ. Instit. 0.05 0.10
% can be borrowed from relatives and friends 0.27 0.28
% can be borrowed in all channels 0.42 0.34 0.17 0.32 0.27 0.38
Note: The level of initial investment for the current entrepreneurs is in real terms using provincial CPI (1995=100)
Table 6: The level of initial investment and the proportion that can be borrowed from various channels
0.12 0.27
Current entrepreneurs 
Total Average  [2] Average 2009 investment  [3]
0.14 0.27






[1] [2] [3] [4]
Credit constraining events 5,454* 6,290*
[2,934] [3,276]
Age/10 0.225 0.139 -10512 -11201
[0.209] [0.360] [9,385] [10,511]
(Age/10)
2 -0.029 -0.033 2134 2223
[0.029] [0.047] [1,326] [1,483]
Year since migration/10 0.212* 0.196 4898 6495
[0.126] [0.230] [5,702] [6,446]
(Year since migration/10)
2 -0.073 0.032 -3539 -4299
[0.059] [0.086] [2,672] [3,033]
Year of schooling 0.041*** 0.080*** -1023 -1,240**
[0.010] [0.017] [468] [523]
Dummy for males 0.188*** -0.081 -4373 -4,956*
[0.050] [0.081] [2,258] [2,528]
Dummy for married 0.029 0.037 -1815 -1773
[0.068] [0.155] [3,054] [3,418]
Self assessed risk 0.030*** 0.042** -665 -987*
[0.010] [0.018] [458] [514]
Believe most people can be trusted -0.016 0.100 -194 610
[0.051] [0.091] [2,278] [2,557]
Network in cities 0.014 0.028 -2662 -3632
[0.013] [0.027] [577] [689]
Hometown housing value/10
4 0.010*** 0.009** 64 42
[0.003] [0.004] [148] [165]
Level of initial investment 0.788*** 0.805***
[0.010] [0.011]
Dummies for starting year Yes
City dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1334 1297 1334 1334
R-squared (Pseudo R-squared) 0.10 0.15 0.84 0.07
LR chi2 2133.19
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in brackets
Note: The level of initial investment for the current entrepreneurs is in real terms using provincial CPI (1995=100)
log(initial investment) Level of investment unable to borrow 
(want-to-be)
Table 7: Initial investment and investment gap
48Annual Effect











Based on Table 3b =1.656*75*50 6210 28.41 6.45 2.13
Based on β  diff. from sep. equ. =4.29*75*50 16087.5 73.59 16.71 5.56
Based on self-predictions =(10.34-7.33)*75*50 11287.5 51.64 11.72 3.87
Notes: A. Migrant total annual earning is 21860 yuan. B. 22.7% of migrants are want-to-be entrepreneurs; C. One third urban labours are 
migrants & they earn one-third of urban workers annual pay.
Table 8: Projected welfare effect of the credit constraints
49Panel A:
Model 1 Model 3 % want-to-be
% of want-to-be 
plus entre.
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Guangzhou -0.530 -0.515 0.35 0.43
[0.051]*** [0.054]***
Dongguan -0.511 -0.537 0.40 0.41
[0.066]*** [0.070]***
Shenzhen -0.530 -0.431 0.42 0.46
[0.083]*** [0.084]***
Zhengzhou -0.531 -0.500 0.43 0.60
[0.080]*** [0.081]***
Luoyang -0.442 -0.411 0.35 0.59
[0.092]*** [0.097]***
Hefei -0.176 -0.173 0.30 0.51
[0.057]*** [0.060]***
Bangbu 0.001 -0.047 0.28 0.48
[0.092] [0.100]
Chongqing -0.433 -0.416 0.36 0.47
[0.043]*** [0.047]***
Shanghai -0.392 -0.345 0.17 0.43
[0.050]*** [0.052]***
Nanjing -0.216 -0.157 0.15 0.27
[0.054]*** [0.061]***
Wuxi -0.071 -0.050 0.09 0.26
[0.070] [0.074]
Hangzhou -0.510 -0.484 0.40 0.53
[0.048]*** [0.051]***
Ningbo -0.512 -0.440 0.35 0.42
[0.070]*** [0.070]***
Wuhan -0.396 -0.381 0.34 0.48
[0.048]*** [0.054]***
Chengdu -0.182 -0.114 0.28 0.43
[0.053]*** [0.061]*
Panel B: Constant Coefficient R-squared No. of obs.
Regression columns [2] and [3]: 0.165 -0.404 0.52 15
[0.043]*** [0.107]***
Regression columns [2] and [4]: 0.374 -0.216 0.17 15
[0.053] [0.131]*
City level regression Mean proportion by city
Table 9: Differential treatment of migrants and entrepreneruship by cities
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53Appendix A: The precise relevant questions in
the survey
A1: Questions used to de￿ne ￿entrepreneurs￿ :
1. Why did you become self-employed?
(1) Cannot ￿nd a wage-salaried job;
(2) I can make more money being self-employed;
(3) I want to be my own boss;
(4) Self-employment gives me more freedom;
(5) Others (please explain).
2. Are you currently still looking for a wage-salaried job?
(1) Yes;
(2) No.
3. If you answered Yes to the above question, could you please tell us the
reason?
(1) I can make more money in a wage-salaried job;
(2) Wage-salaried job maybe more respectable;
(3) Wage-salaried job maybe more stable;
(4) Others (please explain).
A2: Questions used to de￿ne ￿want-to-be entrepreneurs￿ :
1. For wage-salaried workers: Have you ever thought about becoming a
self-employed?
(1) No, never;
(2) Have not though carefully as it seems to be too di¢ cult;
(3) Yes, I have thought (carefully) about it.
2. If you have thought about it, what stopped you from becoming one?
(1) Cannot borrow enough money;
(2) Do not have a network for obtaining a permit and/or customers;
(3) A self employed job is too hard;
(4) The income for self-employment is too low;
(5) Others (please explain).
A3: General Health Questions:
To what extent have you experienced each of the following during the past
few weeks. Please chooses one of four options (measuring the frequency or
severity of the experience):
(1) loss of concentration;
54(2) loss of sleep;
(3) playing a useful role;
(4) capable of making decisions;
(5) constantly under strain;
(6) problems overcoming di¢ culties;
(7) enjoy day-to-day activities;
(8) ability to face problems;
(9) unhappy or depressed;
(10) losing con￿dence;
(11) believe in self-worth;
(12) general happiness.
Appendix B: Some details on the experiments
The experiment takes as its underlying sample the migrant survey of the
2009 RUMiCI data, i.e. 5,123 migrant households from 15 cities in China in
2009. Each of these migrants was sent a call/text from the RUMiCI survey
team to participate in experiments. They were given a choice of dates and
times to come to ￿ the lab￿ , which in most cities was a school class-room in
the city centre. Subjects were told that they would receive 50 Yuan to com-
pensate them for transportation costs, and that the experiments would take
approximately 2.5 hours, with the total compensation depending on their
performance in the experiments. The average participant was compensated
the equivalent of one and half day￿ s pay (100 Yuan). About one third of
the survey respondents showed up, making up the 1,656 individuals in the
experimental sample. Consistency of instructions was guaranteed by using a
video recording.
The 1,656 subjects all participated in 4 activities (apart from instructions
and registration): 3 modules on risk-aversion, time-preference and trust, and
one IQ test in the middle of those experiments. The IQ test was a 30-minute
nonverbal test￿Raven￿ s Standard Progressive Matrices (RSPM).
The risk-aversion module used real monetary payo⁄s and asked partici-
pants to choose between lotteries. Lottery 1 for instance asks a participant to
choose between either option A (the safe option) where a respondent would
get 15 Yuan for sure, or option B that represented a 50% chance of 20 Yuan
and a 50% chance of receiving 0 Yuan. Option A remains the same in lottery
2, but the payo⁄ in option B is higher. In lottery 3 the payo⁄ to option B
is higher still, and this increase is maintained untill lottery 11. Subjects are
told that one out of the 11 lotteries is actually going to be played at random
and they are asked to decide on the lowest lottery where they would choose
55option B. Hence a higher switching point would denote a higher degree of
risk-aversion.
Time-preferences are measured in an analogue manner, with individuals
asked to choose between a payo⁄now or a payo⁄in the future and the payo⁄
in the future increasing over options. The respondent is asked at which point
he/she would accept the future payo⁄ and a higher switching point would
indicate a higher discount rate.
Trust and trustworthiness is measured using the Burks et al (2003) set-up.
Each participants is ￿rstly asked to send anything between 0 and 15 yuan
to a returner. The returner would receive 3 times the amount sent by the
sender and would then be asked how much to return to the sender (anything
between 0 and the amount received). Whilst each subject is both sender and
returner, senders are only told they will be a receiver after they have made
the decision on how much to send (the sender is not matched to the same
person as returner). The amount the sender sends is our measure for trust,
whilst the percentage returned a measure of trustworthiness or reciprocity.
Burks et al (2003) argue that if senders are not informed beforehand about
their future role as a returner, then the two-role game begets the same results








Age 0.374 0.292 0.354 0.336
[0.045]*** [0.242] [0.105]*** [0.289]
Age2 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005
[0.001]*** [0.003] [0.001]*** [0.004]
Years of schooling 0.398 0.209 0.365 0.191
[0.027]*** [0.123]* [0.055]*** [0.149]
Dummy for males 1.454 2.104 1.474 2.614
[0.137]*** [0.587]*** [0.275]*** [0.697]***
Dummy for married 0.434 -0.355 0.635 -0.049
[0.184]** [1.149] [0.355]* [1.314]
Risk loving 0.031 0.241 -0.05 0.249
[0.027] [0.131]* [0.053] [0.155]
Trusting -0.025 0.958 -0.46 1.238
[0.140] [0.667] [0.268]* [0.797]
Size of the social network in the city 0.027 0.114 0.022 0.116
[0.004]*** [0.020]*** [0.007]*** [0.024]***
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4884 1905 1541 1563
R-squared 0.20 0.08 0.18 0.09
Regressions by self-employed and wage-salary groups
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in brackets
Note: Initial investment is excluded from this regression as wage-salary earners do not have this information.
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